On the far side of the terrifying abyss of World War II-the culmination of humanity's most horrific and deadly half century-nations came together and hammered out the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As any legal (or quasi-legal) 1 document of its kind, it truly was the product of an arduous process of negotiation and debate-two years, in fact. Of the forty-eight original signatory nations, none voted against it and only eight abstained, mostly communist bloc countries and one Muslim-majority State, Saudi Arabia.
We are witnessing an unequivocal process of universalization of the concern for human dignity. As international law becomes more responsive to the demands for individual freedom, however, it necessarily challenges the validity of certain state practices reflecting geographical and cultural particularities. The tension between national sovereignty and the enforcement of international human rights standards is highlighted when governments point to national cultural traditions to justify failures to comply with international law. 6 I will come back to Tesòn's argument, but first, I present some foundational theological tenets in both Islam and Christianity that sustain and unequivocally affirm the universal dignity of the human person, both male and female.
I. THE CREATION PRIVILEGE AND MANDATE OF HUMANITY
My own research has shown that Islam, Judaism, and Christianity share a similar view of Adam's empowerment by God at creation as his trustee, steward, or deputy on earth. 7 Both the Qur'an and Bible further teach that this mandate relates to the entire human race through Adam, its first and representative member. Here is the key verse in the Qur'an, keeping in mind that there are several verses where this term khalifa for 
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"vicegerent" (or "trustee," etc.) appears in its plural form:
Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth" They said: "Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?" He said: "I know what ye know not." 8 This initial declaration of humankind's mandate to represent God on earth and thereby be held accountable for the way humans acquit themselves of this responsibility is also an affirmation of their inherent worth in God's eyes-all without exception, by virtue of their creation. This fact is reinforced by two other concepts in the Qur'an. The very next verse explains, at least in part, the reason for humanity's empowerment: "And He taught Adam the nature of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: 'Tell me the nature of these if ye are right. '" 9 This was a challenge to the angels, who initially only saw bloodshed and mayhem in the creation of this new species.
10 Naturally, they could not respond to God's challenge, since literally "knowing the names of all things" was not an ability with which they were endowed. When Adam in turn had demonstrated his Godgiven capacity for reason and the discernment between good and evil (the modern consensus on this verse), the angels bowed down to Adam in humble admiration and recognition of God's wisdom.
11
The other concept is that of God's giving humanity the "trust" of the earth's management: "We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains: but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it-he was indeed unjust and foolish."
12 A cursory reading of this verse will not yield, admittedly, the sense of humanity's trusteeship of the earth. I have delved extensively into how this verse is tied to the above verse on Adam's trusteeship in contemporary Islamic thought elsewhere.
13
A similar picture of humanity's highest role in creation and mission to rule the earth in God's stead is found in the Bible's first page, Genesis 1; here the mandate is "be fruitful and multiply" and "fill the earth and govern it." 14 It is preceded by a short poem inspired by the Ancient Near-Eastern "So God created human beings in his own image.
In the image of God he created them; male and female he created them."
15
So in both cases-in the Qur'an and the Bible-human beings are brought into being at the apex of creation and given the responsibility to rule over all the rest with great care, wisdom, and justice.
This declaration of intrinsic human dignity is only a theological statement-necessary, no doubt, but certainly not sufficient. In the case of the Muslim understanding of religion, orthopraxy (right action) trumps orthodoxy (right doctrine). 16 Plainly an oversimplification, this adage nonetheless points to the fact that for Muslims, as well as for Jews, God's revelation is more about law than theology. Shari'a is thus God's blueprint helping people to find the "straight path" that will lead to life in this world and the next.
17
The Islamic emphasis on law would then lead us to inquire about how classical Islamic Shari'a protected the rights of minorities under Muslim rule or whether men and women were given the same rights in the medieval or late medieval period. But that would be an anachronism, as Europe, for instance, as late as the seventeenth century, was plunged in fratricidal wars of religion-hardly a model of "religious freedom." 18 In the many centuries before that, as well, European states, starting with the Holy Roman Empire, were famous for discriminating against and at times massacring those whose beliefs did not match those of the ruling elites, and the Jews in particular. above point. In the first, Emory University professor Vincent J. Cornell, representing the Muslim side, demonstrates from the events surrounding the mid-tenth-century capture of Baghdad by the Turkish Seljuk army loyal to the Shi'ite dynasty in Egypt (the Fatimids) that "theology and law both matter in Islam and that theological issues cannot be artificially separated from legal and political conflicts."
21 Not surprisingly, as various Muslim sects, ethnicities, and dynasties were often warring with one another and "excommunicating" one another, they were also inclined to treat nonMuslim minorities as less than human-despite Shari'a norms of relative tolerance, at least for "the people of the book." 22 In the next chapter, John Langan, on the Christian side, demonstrates the extreme attraction an authoritarian regime representing one religious sect had on Christian realms up until the Thirty Year War. 23 In the final analysis, neither Muslims nor Christians seemed to know much about, or cared to practice anything closely resembling what we understand today as human rights policies.
As mentioned above, the human rights concept, as a tool of international law, was hammered out laboriously by nations shaken to the core by two world wars. Though there are potential theological building blocks in the Christian and Muslim traditions, international law is a quintessentially modern idea born in the midst of very specific geopolitical and intellectual conditions. As I have argued elsewhere, theology is a reflection on sacred texts based on a particular religious tradition and in light of a specific sociocultural context. 24 True, Muslims have a long history of legal norms that range in application from the individual to the family, and commercial relations to economic and political realities. 25 Yet those bodies of jurisprudential rules (fiqh) 26 spread out between six rather diverse schools of law, were mostly crystallized-at least in their philosophy of law and cultural outlook-somewhere around the eleventh century. 27 I argue that all universal cultures, be they religious or secular, ancient or modern, commonly agree on the inviolability of all human beings. Yet they do so on their own terms, which is an inevitable outcome of social and cultural diversity. Consequently, there is not a single universalism, which is unanimously accepted by humanity as a whole, instead, there are various universalisms emanating from different cultures. . . . Yet the points of agreement are sufficient to serve as the axioms of a global dialogue among them.
37
In the next section I come back to Tesòn's discussion about cultural relativism and its seeming threat to the integrity of human rights theory and explore whether Senturk's above formulation of the problem is in any way compatible with Tesòn's concerns.
II. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
One of three conclusions that Cornell draws in his essay on religious rights in Medieval Islam is that "Muslims need to devote much more time than they have so far to the study of Western moral philosophy." 38 He gives an example from the work of Wesley N. Hohfeld who concluded that "P has a right to X" has four possible meanings, while illustrating his points with the subject of religious freedom in the Islamic past. 39 The first is that of a privilege, or bare liberty, meaning the freedom to practice a strict minimum of their faith. 40 Another version is that "[a] right may constitute a type of immunity from legal change."
41 Though pre-modern Islam was known for respecting minimal worship rights for populations of the ahl alkitab ("people of the book"), 42 A third meaning of right is "the ability or power of an individual to alter existing legal arrangements." 45 Sultans at the court of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad (762-1258) held the reigns of political power in a realm that was being slowly dismantled by rival kingdoms and petty dynasties at the edges of the empire. 46 Yet when it came to the treatment of minorities from a legal standpoint, it was only the ulama (the class of Islamic scholars and jurists) who had the power to change those "religious" laws. Cornell offers some examples of different positions taken by some of these ulama.
47
The fourth meaning is the one most in use today with regard to the philosophy of human rights and it would have raised the bar for Muslim rulers in their responsibility toward minority religious groups: "a claimright" would impose a duty on a sultan to allow Jews and Christians to worship "as they please."
48 Legal philosophers distinguish two types of claim-rights, those in personam and those in rem. 49 Here is Cornell's explanation:
Claim-rights in personam are duties that are assignable to particular persons because of a stipulated right, such as the duties incumbent on a signatory to a contract. A treaty or compact that allows Christian subjects of an Islamic state to build churches or sell pork in their own butcher shops is an example of a claim-right in personam. Claim-rights in rem are duties that are incumbent in principle to everyone. Religious freedom as a claim-right in rem would mean that an Islamic state would have an obligation to actively assist Christians or Jews in the practice of their religion. This might include providing state funds for the construction of churches or synagogues or the prosecution of Muslim subjects for desecrating Christian or Jewish places of worship. In Western societies, violations of claim-rights are 43 
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often punishable by law in this way.
50
However technical these distinctions seem to be, Cornell believes that this is the kind of detail that is needed in discussions taking place nowadays with regard to religious freedom, a human right, after all, stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later covenants. 51 From the application of apostasy laws in several Muslim countries 52 to the virtual lack of any religious freedom in Saudi Arabia, 53 there are no doubt plenty of case studies to tackle. This is also the point that Malcolm Evans, an international lawyer and professor at the University of Bristol School of Law, puts across. For him, "human rights law is developing in a fashion that is likely to hinder rather than assist the realization of the goals of tolerance and religious pluralism." 54 The main reason is that its bias toward "neutrality" actually stifles religious sensibilities, and in the case of the European Court of Human Rights it was the Muslim community that felt the most suppressed.
55
Without delving into the details, the European Court of Human Rights did adjudicate a case involving an Islamist party in Turkey against the state of Turkey in 2003. 56 It declared in its judgment that "Shari'a is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy." 57 Specifically, "a regime based on Shari'a, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women, and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts." 58 As I said earlier, this would be according to a traditionalist and here specifically an Islamist (i.e., part of the wider "political Islam" movement) interpretation of classical Islamic jurisprudence. The court here seems to believe that Shari'a is a reified, unchangeable concept that by definition stands against all the principles and values that Europeans hold dear. The reality is that, like many Muslims as well, the court is confusing Shari'a (or 50 This European Court decision represents a shift, argues Evans, and it took place after the integration of much of Eastern Europe into the EU. 60 It is true, he avers, that human rights are "a methodology for addressing the tensions that arise within the governance of a society." 61 This involves "policing the boundaries between the public and private sphere." 62 On the other hand, as he examined a variety of cases handled by the court, he came to the conclusion that increasingly "ensuring respect" meant not so much "respect by others for religion" but "respect by religions for others." 63 This was plainly what was happening in its very first case, which led to a Jehovah's Witness member being slapped with criminal charges for proselytism.
64
I certainly understand Evans' concerns as a lawyer but I take issue with him when he writes that "the international human rights instruments" do not constitute "an ethical code." 65 True, the application of these instruments must be implemented within the best possible legal framework so that justice is maximized; in that sense it is strictly about law. He likely would have agreed with the point Cornell made that contemporary legal theory was necessary for Muslims (and others) to ponder and, all the more, 59 . 
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how this theory is implemented in practice in societies that are increasingly pluralistic. 66 But just as I contended earlier that theology and law in the case of human rights are intermingled, so are moral philosophy and ethics.
This brings me back to Tesòn's wrestling with cultural relativism, the view according to which "local cultural traditions (including religious, political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and scope of civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society." 67 The logical implication from such a view is that a human rights violation in one context could be considered lawful elsewhere and, in any case, Western ideas of human rights should never be imposed on other countries. 68 As Tesòn puts it, "Tolerance and respect for self-determination preclude crosscultural normative judgments." 69 Here we are plainly dealing with ethical issues arising out of the work of social scientists, and likely also out of a sense of guilt for past colonial sins. Indeed, international law is obliged "to respect the cultural identities of peoples, their local traditions, and customs."
70 At the same time, adds Tesòn, respect for cultural differences in no way rules out a "substantive core" in international human rights law.
71
The core of the human rights paradigm can easily be gleaned from a number of international human rights treaties, as well as the practice of international diplomacy, which by definition is cross-cultural. As Tesòn sees it, these treaties "offer a surprisingly uniform articulation of human rights law." The following rights elaborated in such treaties "should have essentially the same meaning regardless of local traditions:" the rights "to life, to physical integrity, to a fair trial, freedom of expression, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of association, and the prohibition against discrimination," etc.
72
But on his way to refute the position of cultural relativism (at least as a tool to dismantle the integrity and validity of human rights norms), Tesòn declares (contra Malcolm Evans) that "the statesmen who drafted the UN Charter were motivated in part by the moral imperative to restore human dignity and give it legal status."
73 That is why the human rights discourse is itself borrowed from moral philosophy. And despite the many other concerns the United Nations has had to confront over the years-most of them related to issues of national sovereignty and resolving conflictshuman rights law has continued to grow rapidly. Part of this is because moral philosophy remains at the heart of the human rights enterprise. Though some countries with dubious human rights records cannot sometimes be convicted for contravening positive international rules, the world condemns human rights violations as egregious moral wrongs and thereby puts pressure on international leaders to at least censure them, if not force them to change.
74
At this point Tesòn turns his attention to cultural relativism, which comes in three types. The first is "descriptive," simply stating that, in fact, societies catalog right and wrong differently. 75 Tesòn admits that this can be the case, but this type is not his main concern. He would even be willing to concede it for the sake of his argument. 76 The second type, "metaethical" relativism, is a philosophical assertion about ethical values-they either do not exist, or they cannot be meaningfully grasped or demonstrated.
77
"Normative" relativism is the third type. It is neither on the level of an anthropologist describing the moral values by which a particular society lives, nor is it on the level of ethical theory, as is metaethical relativism. 78 Rather, normative relativism operates on a more practical moral plane by asserting that people in various cultural contexts ought to follow the ethical norms of their society.
79
Tesòn first shows how the metaethical relativist can still function in the world without having an infallible method for proving moral truth, 80 but he devotes more space to refuting the normative relativist position. 81 In the first place, it is incoherent: on the one hand it asserts that there are no universal moral principles, and on the other, it states that one always ought to follow the moral principles of one's society-a universal moral statement. 82 Secondly, moral discourse aims at universalizability. 86 In fact we come back to the beginning of this paper: human rights discourse asserts that all people's worth qua human beings are entitled to basic and inalienable rights.
I began this section asking whether Recep Senturk's assertion that there were "several universalisms" and yet enough common moral ground "to serve as the axioms of a global dialogue" among its various cultures was still compatible with the universality of the human rights paradigm. I think that it is. As much as I agree with Tesón's refutation of cultural relativism, I do not think that he would strongly disagree with Senturk's assertion. He would probably ask him to define that "core" more specifically and would probably chide Senturk for his use of the plural "universalisms." But this points to the complexity of human rights discourse. While Evans sees it as a strictly legal instrument, Tesón considers it primarily a moral philosophy, at least in its roots and universal appeal. Senturk, for his part, looks at the many disagreements among Muslims themselves about how to reinterpret their millennium-long tradition of religious jurisprudence, and suggests that it would be prudent to include different approaches to human rights, while of course holding fast to the universal primacy of human dignity.
All of this underscores the multifaceted nature of "human rights" as a concept. Another angle from which to grasp this complexity is provided by Heather Widdows in her book, Global Ethics: An Introduction. 87 Professor of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham's Department of Philosophy, 88 Widdows explains how this relatively new field of study draws from an array of disciplines-philosophy, politics, public policy, law, theology, international development, and sociology. 89 The issues global ethics explores range from "the 'war on terror,' rogue states, child labour, torture, scarce resources, trafficking, migration, climate change, global trade, medical tourism, global pandemics, humanitarian intervention and so 84 91 Notice how "human rights" theory forms one of three major theoretical frameworks, which, in a complementary way, illuminate and guide the task of thinking ethically about our shrinking world's challenges.
The very fact that human rights are widely recognized as valid and important instruments make them "the most obvious candidate to be considered a global ethic in the current system of global governance." 92 Global ethics, as she has argued in preceding chapters, "requires some kind of universalist approach and human rights offer a means to assert universal respect for all human beings simply on the grounds that they are human." 93 She then evaluates which among the competing moral theories are best suited to support human rights theory. 94 Further on in this chapter on rights she notes that "it is important to recognize that human rights as established in the current global system are not always directly equivalent to rights as understood in philosophical theories." 95 Her explanation leads us back to our prior discussion using Tesón and Evans as interlocutors. International law is just that-legal documents meant to be debated and adjudicated in international courts as specific cases arise: "While philosophical works do, of course, feed into how human rights are regarded, particularly with regard to how they are established and justified, how they work in practice is largely a matter of law and governance mechanisms." 96 My last point in this paper, however, is a good example of a whole area of human rights that does not fall under the purview of international law: economic rights, as they are laid out in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Here, more than in any other area, theology and moral theory come together to provide, if not a road map, then at least a strong incentive to reduce the glaring economic inequalities in our world.
III. A MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DECLARATION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Widdows is particularly helpful in introducing theoretical concerns we will need to for considering economic rights. The first distinction she 
